On epistemic responsibility while remembering the past: the case of individual and historical memories by Trakas, Marina
Tous droits réservés © Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de
Montréal, 2020
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d’auteur. L’utilisation des
services d’Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d’utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne.
https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de
l’Université de Montréal, l’Université Laval et l’Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche.
https://www.erudit.org/fr/
Document généré le 4 sep. 2020 15:54
Les ateliers de l'éthique
The Ethics Forum
ON EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY WHILE REMEMBERING THE
PAST: THE CASE OF INDIVIDUAL AND HISTORICAL MEMORIES
Marina Trakas
Volume 14, numéro 2, automne 2019
URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1071139ar
DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/1071139ar
Aller au sommaire du numéro
Éditeur(s)
Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de Montréal
ISSN
1718-9977 (numérique)
Découvrir la revue
Citer cet article
Trakas, M. (2019). ON EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY WHILE REMEMBERING
THE PAST: THE CASE OF INDIVIDUAL AND HISTORICAL MEMORIES. Les
ateliers de l'éthique / The Ethics Forum, 14 (2), 240–273.
https://doi.org/10.7202/1071139ar
Résumé de l'article
La notion de responsabilité épistémique appliquée à la mémoire est
généralement étudiée dans le cadre des responsabilités qui incombent à une
collectivité pour des injustices passées, mais elle n’a jamais fait l’objet d’une
analyse indépendante. Dans cet article, je propose d’isoler et d’explorer cette
notion en détail. Pour ce faire, je conceptualise d’abord la responsabilité
épistémique appliquée aux souvenirs individuels. Je conclus qu’un individu
qui se remémore le passé peut être considéré comme responsable du point de
vue épistémique dans la mesure où il est un agent de vigilance sachant quand
s’engager dans différents types d’actions mentales et non mentales de sorte à
surveiller et de mettre à jour ses souvenirs, et qui développe et entretient
différents types d’attitudes vertueuses qui guident ces actions. Ces attitudes
(épistémiques) vertueuses sont orientées non seulement envers soi-même mais
aussi envers les autres. Bien que cette conception de la responsabilité
épistémique ne pose pas problème lorsqu’elle est employée pour comprendre
les souvenirs collectifs des membres d’une famille ou d’un groupe d’amis, elle
peut sembler inadéquate en ce qui concerne les souvenirs des collectivités à
grande échelle. Ces souvenirs, que j’appelle des souvenirs historiques, sont des
souvenirs d’événements qui ont eu un impact traumatique dans la
communauté, qui sont imprégnés de relations de pouvoir inégales, qui
entretiennent une relation complexe avec la science historique, et qui
présentent d’autres caractéristiques les distinguant des souvenirs individuels.
En dépit de ces différences, l’analyse entreprise dans ce travail montre que les
principes généraux qui président à la responsabilité épistémique des individus
et des collectivités (à grande échelle) qui se remémorent leur passé sont
similaires et sont fondés sur des motifs similaires : des considérations
pragmatiques sur les conséquences des erreurs et des omissions de la mémoire
ainsi qu’un sentiment de soin. Ces similitudes à l’échelle individuelle et
collective de l’attitude épistémique vigilante qui est – et doit être – prise envers
notre passé peuvent justifier, du moins en partie, l’utilisation de la même
épithète – la « mémoire » – pour faire référence à ces différents types de
représentations.
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ABSTRACT:
The notion of epistemic responsibility applied tomemory has been in general examined in the frame-
work of the responsibilities that a collective holds for past injustices,but it has never been the object of
an analysis of its own. In this article, I endeavour to isolate and explore it in detail.To this end, I start by
conceptualizing the epistemic responsibility applied to individualmemories. I conclude that an episte-
mically responsible individual rememberer is a vigilant agent who knowswhen to engage in different
kinds of mental and nonmental actions in order tomonitor and update his or her memories, and who
develops and nurtures different kinds of virtuous attitudes that guide those actions.These (epistemic)
virtuousattitudesareorientednot only towardsoneself but also towardsothers.Although this concep-
tion of epistemic responsibility does not pose a problem for understanding sharedmemories of family
members and friends, it may seem suspicious when applied to large-scale collective memories. These
memories,which I namehistoricalmemories,arememories of events that have a traumatic impact for
the community, are permeated by unequal relations of power, maintain a complex relationship with
historical science, and present other characteristics that distinguish them from individual memories.
But despite these differences, the analysis undertaken in this work shows that the general principles
that govern theepistemic responsibility of individual and (large-scale) collective rememberers are simi-
lar, andarebasedon similar grounds:pragmatic considerations about the consequences ofmisremem-
bering or forgetting and a feeling of care. The similarities on the individual and collective scale of the
epistemically vigilant attitude that is and should be taken toward our significant past may partially
justify the use of the same epithet—“memory”—to refer to these different kinds of representations.
RÉSUMÉ :
Lanotionde responsabilitéépistémiqueappliquéeà lamémoireest généralement étudiéedans le cadre
des responsabilitésqui incombent àune collectivitépourdes injusticespassées,mais ellen’a jamais fait
l’objet d’une analyse indépendante. Dans cet article, je propose d'isoler et d’explorer cette notion en
détail.Pour ce faire, je conceptualised'abord la responsabilitéépistémiqueappliquéeauxsouvenirs indi-
viduels. Je conclus qu'un individu qui se remémore le passé peut être considéré comme responsable du
point de vue épistémique dans lamesure où il est un agent de vigilance sachant quand s'engager dans
différents types d'actionsmentales et nonmentales de sorte à surveiller et demettre à jour ses souve-
nirs, et qui développe et entretient différents types d'attitudes vertueuses qui guident ces actions. Ces
attitudes (épistémiques) vertueuses sont orientées non seulement envers soi-mêmemais aussi envers
les autres.Bien que cette conception de la responsabilité épistémiquenepose pas problème lorsqu'elle
est employéepour comprendre les souvenirs collectifsdesmembresd’une familleoud’ungrouped’amis,
elle peut sembler inadéquate en ce qui concerne les souvenirs des collectivités à grande échelle. Ces
souvenirs,que j’appelledes souvenirs historiques,sont des souvenirsd'événementsqui ont euun impact
traumatique dans la communauté, qui sont imprégnés de relations de pouvoir inégales, qui entretien-
nent une relation complexe avec la science historique, et qui présentent d’autres caractéristiques les
distinguant des souvenirs individuels. En dépit de ces différences, l'analyse entreprise dans ce travail
montre que les principes généraux qui président à la responsabilité épistémique des individus et des
collectivités (àgrandeéchelle) qui se remémorent leurpassé sont similaires et sont fondés surdesmotifs
similaires : des considérations pragmatiques sur les conséquences des erreurs et des omissions de la
mémoire ainsi qu’un sentiment de soin.Ces similitudes à l’échelle individuelle et collective de l’attitude
épistémique vigilante qui est – et doit être – prise envers notre passé peuvent justifier, du moins en
partie, l’utilisation de lamême épithète – la «mémoire » – pour faire référence à ces différents types de
représentations.
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Some of the literature on ethical issues related to collective forms of memory has
focused on the notion of “taking responsibility for the past” (see, for example,
Blustein, 2008). The idea of taking responsibility for the past is a quite broad notion
that looks into the ways in which a community should appropriately relate to its
own history. Although discussions around this issue should in principle analyze the
community’s relationship with its past, whether or not there was wrongdoing, these
kinds of discussions are in fact mostly focused on past injustices and thus also
deal with ethical questions concerning collective-memory formations. As Blus-
tein (2008) explains, “if the question of responsibility for past wrongs is going to
be taken up collectively … the truth about the past … must become part of the
group’s collective self-understanding” (p. 138). That is why the question about
the way in which a collective must be vigilant at the moment of recollecting its past
enters into play. Collectives hold a certain epistemic responsibility if they aim to
take concrete measures to repair past injustices.
The idea of taking responsibility for the past presupposes the idea of an epis-
temically responsible collective rememberer. Although it is true that these two
responsibilities are not discrete stages in the process of coming to terms with
the past (Blustein, 2008), they are conceptually distinguishable. Because the
notion of an epistemically responsible collective rememberer has been generally
studied inside this framework, an independent conceptual analysis that exclu-
sively focuses on this concept may be beneficial to achieve a better understand-
ing of it. What is more, because this notion concerns not only collectives but
also individual forms of memory, the analysis of the way in which remember-
ers may be epistemically responsible for their personal memories is certainly a
fruitful start to understand the collective counterpart.
Unlike Corlett’s (2008) notion of epistemic responsibility, which is applied to the
beliefs that a person voluntarily and autonomously forms, my interest here is to
understand in general terms what it means to be an epistemically responsible
rememberer. So, my analysis does not aim to present the necessary and sufficient
conditions in which a rememberer is epistemically responsible for his or her
memories, nor the different levels and kinds of epistemic responsibility that
apply to different situations, but rather the general attitude that rememberers (as
individual and collective epistemic agents) adopt—and should adopt—in their
pursuit of accurate memories about their past experiences.
Many of the ideas developed in this article, especially those concerning collec-
tive forms of memory, are not necessarily new but are widely scattered in the
literature. The aim here is to try to systematize these ideas in order to offer an
account of what it means to be epistemically responsible rememberers of our
own history. To do this, I examine the notion of epistemic responsibility applied
to individual memories, in order to better grasp what is at stake with this concept
and to consider whether this notion thus formulated is sufficient for under-
standing the epistemic responsibility of large-scale collective rememberers.
Before entering into this last topic, which is also the main issue developed in this
article, I analyze the notion of collective memory and propose to apply the term
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“historical memories” to a subset of collective memories that are produced by
large-scale collective rememberers, then I present other specific and distinctive
traits that differentiate them from family memories and other cases of small-
scale collective memories. Once the notion of historical memory is defined and
characterized, I come back to the main purpose of this article in order to see
whether the notion of epistemic responsibility previously conceptualized for
individual memories is also adequate for understanding cases of historical
memories. Setting apart the differences between these two types of memories, I
conclude that the epistemic responsibility that founds both of them is based on
similar grounds: pragmatic considerations about the consequences of misre-
membering or forgetting and a feeling of care. Therefore, this article aims to
shed light not only on the notion of epistemic responsibility applied to individ-
ual and collective memories, but also on conceptual distinctions in the field of
memory studies that sometimes are quite blurred due to an absence of specific
characterizations (as it happens, for example, with the concept of historical
memory).
MEMORY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE
REMEMBERERS
At first sight, it may be natural to believe that memory is a capacity that to a
large extent is out of our control: either we remember—that is, we manage to
accurately represent a past experience—or we do not. The possibility of accu-
rately representing past experiences may certainly imply a cognitive effort at
encoding and at retrieval, except, manifestly, for cases of involuntary memory.
I may pay extreme attention and repeat some information many times in order
to be sure of correctly encoding it, and I may also mentally move along a chain
of associated ideas in order to arrive at the one I am searching for. Although
people can sometimes be blamed for not having made enough effort to encode
some important information, people are not generally blamed for not making
enough effort to retrieve it. This difference in blameworthiness is probably
grounded in the belief that we have little control over our retrieval processes, so,
if we cannot retrieve something we previously learnt or experienced, it is because
the idea was never encoded—or in fact it was, but later “vanished” from our
mind. In conclusion, although sometimes we can be blamed for not having paid
enough attention in order to retain some important information, it may be quite
natural to believe that rememberers do not really have control over memory
processes after the encoding stage, so in general they are not accountable when
forgetting or misremembering.
Because this common-sense idea assigns a very low (almost nonexistent) degree
of epistemic responsibility to rememberers, I propose to call it the minimal
version of epistemic responsibility applied to memory. According to the minimal
version of epistemic responsibility applied to memory, rememberers are respon-
sible only for making a cognitive effort toward retaining valuable information,
and can be blamed only for not having made enough effort at the encoding stage,
but do not have any other responsibility at the retrieval stage if they misre-
member or forget.
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On the other hand, the minimal version of epistemic responsibility applied to
memory is based on the conceptualization of accurate memory as retrieval of
an idea previously encoded. This conceptualization obeys a preservationist
conception of memory: if memory preserves past perceptions and experiences,
and if these past perceptions and experiences were true at the moment of encod-
ing them, memory then ensures that the recalled representations are also true. In
fact, there are two variants of preservationism: the version just mentioned is
focused on the preservation of perceptions and ideas (Locke, 1690; Hume,
1732), whereas the most recent version considers that what is preserved is the
memory trace of the past event from which this past true representation can be
constructed or inferred by the mind (Martin and Deutscher, 1966; Bernecker,
2010). In any case, both versions suppose that memory preserves content
because it guarantees a sort of linear causal link between past representations and
present ones. If memory preserves content, and also truth if the past perceptual
representation was true, then the only effort we need to make in an act of recol-
lection is to try to find the representation we are looking for. If we fail to do this,
and thus we cannot remember it or we misremember it, the failure can be cred-
ited only to the malfunctioning of memory mechanisms over which we have no
control, but not to the epistemic agents that we are. According to this conception,
memory is involuntary and thus more similar to the muscles of the heart than to
those of the hand (Margalit, 2002, p. 56). The minimal version of epistemic
responsibility applied to memory and preservationism about memory seem to go
hand in hand.
Nonetheless, the preservationist conceptualization of memory is a very ques-
tionable idea. First of all, distortions and delusions are not exclusively patho-
logical phenomena that arise from brain disease: healthy people are very prone
to intrusions, errors, and distortions that lead to the formation of memory illu-
sions (Kopelman, 1987). Sometimes these memory errors and illusions can be
as simple as misremembering where one put the keys, and other times they imply
misremembering an entire experience. They can be created by endogenous
factors, such as anomalous processing of input or a vivid imagination, but they
can also be the result of exogenous influences such as social coercion or
suggestibility (Kopelman, 1999). The variety and frequency of memory errors
and illusions cast doubt on the conceptualization of memory as a capacity that
fundamentally preserves past experiences.
False memories are thus very common. But the mechanisms and processes that
generate everyday false memories are not dissimilar from those that produce
faithful ones. And this leads us to the second point that thwarts the preserva-
tionist conception of memory and the possibility of directly accessing the past.
Memory is always reconstructive: “reconstruction in general (and content gener-
ation in particular) is not the exception but the rule” (Michaelian, 2011, p. 328).
Over the last decades, empirical research has provided strong evidence for the
flexible and dynamic nature of our memory systems, which extract and recom-
bine elements of different experiences and adapt the reconstruction of past event
to the specific demands of the context of remembering. While a reproductive
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memory would not present much benefit from an evolutionary perspective,
reconstructive memory is highly adaptive: it allows individuals to flexibly use
past experiences in order to simulate future events and plan their actions accord-
ingly (Schacter, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a price to pay for this high level of
adaptability: the impossibility for our memory systems to keep exact replicas
and records of past experiences. If memories are not reproductions but recon-
structions from a network of distributed memory traces, there cannot be a linear
connection between a memory representation and a past experience or event
(Robins, 2016).
Consequently, if memory cannot guarantee direct access to the past, the relia-
bility of memory as a source of information is brought into question. Some
authors have proposed that we should work with a default assumption of trust in
our memories (Sutton, 2003). If we do not do this, we are forced to deny the
possibility of gaining any knowledge through this source (Michaelian, 2013).
And it is true that the denial of this possibility does not sound reasonable:
although there may be empirical evidence that shows that our memory systems
produce a significant number of errors and distortions, in everyday life in general
we manage to successfully navigate the physical and social world. So, it seems
that in one way or another, the information from the past that we use for prag-
matic purposes is quite accurate. This can be possible only if the trust in our
memories is not a simple blind trust. If we succeed at constructing or making use
of accurate information gained through past experiences, it is not because we
simply trust our memory systems, but because we in fact exert different kinds
of control processes over it. As Sperber et al. (2010) stated, “vigilance (unlike
distrust) is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite of blind trust” (p. 363). So,
what we trust is the resulting information delivered by these unconscious and
conscious control processes over our memory systems, not the information deliv-
ered by our “naked” retrieval processes themselves. And these control processes
make the rememberer an epistemically vigilant agent: in fact, it is epistemic vigi-
lance that counteracts the memory’s inclination to distortion or error.
Thanks to this vigilant stance, memory is thus a sufficiently reliable source of
information. Some of these specific control processes are unconscious and auto-
matic, and are part of the process of remembering itself. Metacognitive mecha-
nisms internal to the rememberer operate during the production of a
representation of a past experience, in order to monitor and control the process
itself, as well as the source of the remembered information. Whereas process
monitoring allows the agent to determine whether he or she is remembering or
engaging in some other form of construction, such as imagination, source moni-
toring evaluates different features of the remembered information (and its
compatibility with other experiences and beliefs) in order to determine whether
its source is a personal past experience or not (Michaelian, 2012). So, recollec-
tion is in fact a two-level process that involves not only the retrieval of stored
information, but also metamemory processes that monitor that information and
determine endorsement or rejection (ibid.). On the other hand, both internal
processes of monitoring can also become conscious, reflective, and intentional,
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especially when the rememberer has some doubts about the reliability of his or
her memory. Metacognition is not only implicit but can be explicit as well (Frith,
2012). Furthermore, the physical and social world is full of material traces left
by past events, so it can act as a sort of external memory to which the remem-
berer can have access when he or she needs to (Sutton, 2010). If I am at the
supermarket and am not so sure if I have to buy bananas, I can try to reconstruct
the moment I opened the fridge to see which fruits and vegetables were lacking,
but I can also take out my shopping list and simply check the items that I previ-
ously wrote down.
Therefore, the rememberer has different mechanisms at his or her disposal in
order to become an epistemically vigilant agent: the rememberer can monitor the
formation of his or her memories and verify the accuracy of the remembered
information. Some of these mechanisms are unconscious and automatic, whereas
others are intentional and voluntary. Some refer to mental acts; others to exter-
nal behaviour. But all these different kinds of mechanisms allow the remem-
berer to generally form accurate representations of the past, despite the
reconstructive and fallible nature of our memory. In conclusion, memory does
not enable a sort of immediate access to past truths, but rememberers have at
their disposal sufficient cognitive and technological tools to faithfully recon-
struct their past experiences in accordance with the pragmatic demands of the
context of remembering.
To sum up, if memory preserves past experiences, epistemic vigilance with
respect to memory is incorrect not only from a descriptive point of view, but
also from a normative one: because people cannot exert any control over their
memories—they are preserved or they are not—they cannot be compelled to do
so either. But because empirical evidence shows that preservationism is wrong
and memory is essentially reconstructive, epistemic vigilance is the rule.
Rememberers not only execute different kinds of control processes in an act of
recollection, but also must do this in order to guarantee memory accuracy
(Michaelian, 2012).
This implies that rememberers are—to different degrees of blameworthiness and
praiseworthiness—epistemically responsible not only at the encoding stage, but
essentially at recollection. Compared to the minimal degree of epistemic respon-
sibility that emerges from the preservationist conceptualization of memory, the
version of epistemic responsibility implied by the reconstructive nature of
memory is much stronger. But, at the same time, when memory is essentially
reconstructive, this version of epistemic responsibility can also be considered
quite standard. Because of this, I propose to call it the basic version of epistemic
responsibility applied to memory. According to this version, rememberers must
act as epistemic vigilant agents, which means that they are responsible for
executing different kinds of actions related to processes of control, monitoring,
and updating in order to construct accurate memory representations, and can be
blamed for not having done them when they misremember or forget. This
constraint does not mean that on each occasion rememberers must intentionally
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engage in multiple kinds of actions in order to monitor their memories: it would
be cognitively costly to do so in situations where there is no reason to doubt, or
when misremembering has no possible negative outcome. Epistemic vigilance
is context sensitive: the particularities of the context of retrieval determine
whether it is necessary to engage in monitoring and control processes and orien-
tate the possible actions that could be performed for this purpose.1
In fact, rememberers generally know when they need to engage in further moni-
toring and control processes because they already are epistemically vigilant
rememberers. And although epistemic vigilance may be considered to be an epis-
temic virtue that can (and should) be cultivated through time, it is developed
partially in a spontaneous way,2 in order to avoid the negative consequences for
practical life of having too many false memories. To paraphrase Sperber et al.
(2010), if we broadly trust our representations of the past, it is because we are
already epistemically vigilant agents. Normally, rememberers reflectively moni-
tor their memory processes and sources and engage in different kinds of prag-
matic actions in order to verify or change the remembered information because
of the pragmatic benefits of having accurate memories: false and distorted
memories lead usually to poor decisions and ineffective or detrimental actions.
But sometimes other kinds of less practical reasons push rememberers to adopt
this vigilant stance. These reasons concern attitudes related to oneself that are
epistemically virtuous, such as self-criticism, sincerity with oneself, and avoid-
ance of self-deception. They do not spontaneously develop, are hard to adopt,
and may even present some disadvantages: although too many false and
distorted personal memories are certainly maladaptive, some false memories
can present more pragmatic and immediate benefits for the rememberer, espe-
cially for his or her psychological well-being (Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett,
2018). A rapist may unconsciously prefer to remember that his victim wanted to
have sexual intercourse with him or that she explicitly provoked him, in order
to avoid recognizing himself as the perpetrator of a hideous action. So, these
epistemic virtues that are also at the origin of epistemic vigilance with respect
to memory are not naturally developed by the pressure of taking good decisions
and being effective while navigating the physical and social environment. They
need to be cultivated and nurtured and thus require a continuous effort on one’s
own part.
Consequently, epistemic vigilance about memory is motivated not only by direct
pragmatic benefits of forming accurate representations of the past, but also by
epistemic virtues like sincerity with oneself. It does not seem possible to be a real
vigilant rememberer without adopting and developing certain epistemic virtues
that actively guide the process of reconstruction of past experiences. Conse-
quently, the epistemic responsibility applied to memory implies more than what
the basic version states. For rememberers to act as epistemically vigilant agents,
they must not only execute different kinds of updating, monitoring, and control
processes of their memories, but also develop and nurture certain kinds of epis-
temically virtuous attitudes related to themselves, such as self-criticism, sincer-
ity with oneself, and avoidance of self-deception. These epistemically virtuous
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attitudes orientate the kinds of mental and nonmental actions that must be
performed in order to be epistemically vigilant while reconstructing the personal
past. So, epistemic vigilance with respect to memory is not only context sensi-
tive but also virtue dependent: it depends on the possession of certain epistemic
virtues for its good performance.
It remains to be seen whether these epistemic virtues are sufficient for being a
full vigilant rememberer. To explore this issue, I propose that we consider memo-
ries that are important not only for our own identity but also for interpersonal
relationships, for the common history and identity we shape with others. Most
of these important memories cannot be reduced to a fact that can be easily veri-
fied through internal monitoring processes and acts of verification performed in
the outer world. They present an evaluative component because they refer to
more than the material world: these memories involve other people, their actions,
and the impact and meaning that other people and their actions have in our life.
At least two different kinds of evaluations shape the way in which we remem-
ber past events: ethical and affective ones. The ethical component refers to eval-
uations concerning what is right and what is wrong. An example would be when
I remember that my boss continuously takes advantage of me. This memory can
also present an affective component if, for example, I feel simultaneously angry.
Affective evaluations refer to the personal significance and meaning that an
event has for the subject in terms of harms and benefits. Some of these evalua-
tions are so bound up with the way we remember past events that it becomes
impossible to separate our evaluative perspective from a state of affairs that
would be objectively verifiable. Therefore, when individuals have different eval-
uative perspectives about a shared past event, it is not so easy to determine what
a rememberer should do in the presence of memories divergent from his or her
own. Simply ignoring others’ memories does not seem to be a responsible action
from a conscientious rememberer. This is for two reasons.
The first reason concerns the way in which the evaluative aspects of our memo-
ries are constructed, and the consequences that these memories have. Although
we may experience the past individually, its affective and moral significance is
in general determined with others, because we are relational beings who
constantly “negotiate the past—both the personal past and the shared past—in
company” (Sutton, 2006 p. 126): that is, through relations with other people and
other narratives. What is more, many of these meaningful memories are not
simply private and passive representations without any causal effect in the world:
by reinforcing or resisting those of others, these memories contribute to other
people’s grasp of the meaning of a shared past, and even to the construction of
their identity (Campbell 2006, 2014). This is particularly remarkable in the cases
of thick relationships—that is, of relationships with people with whom we have
strong ties, which are essentially built on care (such as friendship, partnership,
family ties, etc.). Memory is clearly constitutive of the notion of care: “If I care
for someone or for something, and then I forget that person or that thing, this
means that I have stopped caring for him or it” (Margalit, 2002, p. 28). We stop
caring about someone with whom we have a thick relationship not only when we
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forget him or her, as Margalit (2002) has emphasized, but also when we fail to
understand his or her perspective of a common and shared experience. For exam-
ple, my husband can remember that during the fight we had last night I yelled
and treated him with disdain, but I might not remember the fight that way—that
is, I remember that we had a normal and peaceful argument. Because I care about
my husband, it seems responsible to take into consideration his perspective of
the fight while constructing a common narrative of it, and to even rethink and
reshape my own memory. If I refuse to consider his perspective, especially if I
frequently adopt this attitude, it means that I do not take his feelings and evalu-
ations of what happened seriously. If I disdain his words and thoughts as not
worth it, I fail to care about his feelings and points of view, and this means that
I fail to care about him tout court. When we care about other people, we care also
about the way we shape our own relationship together and construct our common
reality. It is in fact this care, then, that generally pushes us to adopt certain kinds
of attitudes towards the way we remember common experiences: to be open-
minded and responsive to others’ memories, to the extent of being willing to
remember the past differently.
Consequently, the construction of our memories cannot simply be motivated by
values and virtues such as the search of accuracy and truthfulness to oneself: it
must also imply being true to others. Campbell (2006, 2014) uses the notion of
integrity to refer to this implicit accountability to others for the way in which we
remember our common past: “The integrity with which we remember has to do
both with how we understand our own past in ways that contribute to self-knowl-
edge, identity, and the shape of personal responsibilities and possibilities, and
also with whether others can rely on our memories not only for what they do not
know but also as a contribution to a social grasp of the significance of a shared
past” (Campbell, 2006, p. 374). This notion of integrity introduces the second
point I wanted to make against the disregard of other people’s memories about
a common past. According to Campbell, integrity is an epistemic virtue closely
linked to accuracy in the reconstruction of faithful memories. But the descrip-
tion presented above is somehow ambiguous. Integrity appears more as a moral
virtue than as an epistemic one: a failure of integrity related to our memories is
a failure of care, not in principle a failure of accuracy. Nonetheless, the notion
of integrity does not only refer to having the right sort of relation to ourselves
as well as other people with whom we have thick relationships, and their narra-
tives. It presents a simpler meaning: the wholeness and completeness of some-
thing—in our case, memory. A memory of a shared past does not seem really
complete without the integration of the different evaluative perspectives of that
past made by the different participants. While talking about last night’s fight, I
consider the perspective of my husband not only because I care about my
husband but also because I might care about getting a complete picture of what
happened last night, including the subjective feelings and moral appreciations of
my husband. If I refuse to consider his perspective, especially if I frequently
adopt this attitude, I fail to recognize not only the evaluative components of our
memories, but also the existence itself of different meanings, subjective feel-
ings, and appreciations that can be directed towards an event. What is more,
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without the perspective of the other, I may also fail to be sincere with myself and
to avoid self-deception: it may be the open-mindedness towards others that
allows those self-focused virtuous epistemic attitudes to rise and flourish.
Personal memories of shared and common past experiences thus gain in accu-
racy when they are integral. Therefore, integrity related to memory is not only
a moral virtue that is valuable in itself for developing and maintaining good rela-
tionships of care. According to this second sense, integrity is also essential for
accuracy, so it is at the same time an epistemic virtue. Although it is probably
the care for others that is the major force that moves us to take into account their
perspectives of a shared past, this care leads at the same time to the construction
of more accurate memories.
If integrity is a constitutive part of memory accuracy—at least for memories of
shared and common experiences—an epistemically vigilant rememberer is an
agent who adopts an epistemically vigilant stance not only towards himself or
herself, but also towards others. Consequently, the basic version of epistemic
responsibility is not really sufficient; a reformulation of the notion of epistemic
responsibility is thus needed. This version is clearly more demanding than the
previous one; that is why I propose to call it the strong version of epistemic
responsibility applied to memory. According to this strong version, epistemi-
cally responsible rememberers not only must engage in different kinds of actions
in order to control, monitor, and update their memory processes, and be guided
by certain kinds of self-focused epistemically virtuous attitudes, but must also
develop and nurture other-focused virtuous attitudes such as being open-minded
and responsive to other people’s perspectives when it is a shared and common
past that is remembered. So, in this strong version of the epistemic responsibil-
ity applied to memory, the moral responsibility is explicitly present. Care leads
us to consider other perspectives in the construction of memories and to develop
other-focused attitudes that are morally good and epistemically good: they
nurture the care we owe to people with whom we have thick relationships, while
at the same time enhancing the accuracy of our memories of shared experiences.
Although the moral responsibility we have as rememberers is conceptually
distinct from the epistemic responsibility, both of them converge in the construc-
tion of our significant memories. It seems difficult to conceive of a fully vigi-
lant rememberer who is not simultaneously a virtuous rememberer. Epistemic
vigilance with respect to memory is virtue dependent not only because it is
contingent on epistemic virtues, but also because it is contingent on moral
virtues. It seems thus that epistemic vigilance partially depends on the develop-
ment of a virtuous character (Audi, 1991).3
The notion of integrity certainly enhances and enriches the conception of epis-
temic responsibility applied to memory. However, this later becomes more
complex and difficult to grasp when the kinds of memories that are at stake are
not individual memories or memories of groups whose members have thick rela-
tionships with one another, but memories of large-scale collectives such as
nations.
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It is thus necessary to better examine the nature of these collective memories—
and the nature of collective memory in general—in order to conceptualize a suit-
able notion of epistemic responsibility applied to these cases.
THE NOTION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY
It is a commonplace in the literature to highlight the vagueness and uncertain-
ties that surround the concept of “collective memory,” which was first intro-
duced by Halbwachs (1925). As Wertsch and Roediger (2008) have stated,
“collective memory is a term that is widely used, yet poorly understood in
contemporary academic discourse” (p. 318). While it is difficult to deny the fact
that we each have our own memories about personal past experiences, it is more
difficult to accept that a certain human group has a common memory of an expe-
rience that it considers its own.
The first problem that arises is how we should conceive the nature of this shared
memory and of the collective that remembers. Some authors consider that
although social resources and practices shape our memories, only people can
memorize and remember and not collectives (Kansteiner, 2002). Collective
memory would be “shared individual memories that shape collective identity”
(Hirst and Manier, 2013, p. 196). This individualist conception of collective
memory is also related to the tendency to analyze collective memory in the same
terms as individual memories, as if the collective were an individual (Ricœur,
2006).4 For other authors, there is a distinction to be made between the aggre-
gated individual memories of members of a group and real collective memo-
ries. While the first case can be considered to be only “collected memories”
(Olick, 1999) or “common memories” (Margalit, 2002), the concept of collec-
tive memories refers to public symbolic representations of a common past that
are situated “in the world” and have a certain independence from individuals. But
this holistic conception of collective memory is also far for being consensual.
Just like individual memories, which are not representations of the personal past
fixed once and for all, but which often change according to the particular context
of retrieval, collective memories are not a static body of knowledge shared by a
group of individuals and materialized in their culture through different social
technologies. Wertsch and Roediger (2008), for example, believe that the essence
of collective memory would be better characterized by the term “collective
remembering,” which reveals the struggles, contestations, and negotiations that
characterize the accounts of a common past. This emphasis on the idea of collec-
tive memory as a complex and dynamic process that extends through time also
presents some similarities with the more recent conception of individual memory
not as a mental state but as a mental act.
There is also a second problem stirred up by the concept of collective memory,
which is related to the relationship between the collective and the experience
that this collective remembers. Michaelian and Sutton (2017) hold that a truly
collective memory would require that individuals interact at the moment of
encoding a common experience and also at the moment of remembering it. This
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strong conception of the notion of collective memory may lead us to believe that
there is a single and quite unitary collective memory representation that is held
by the group.5 Nonetheless, this notion could in principle be applicable only to
small-scale groups: members of large-scale groups that are affected by the same
event necessarily have divergent experiences of that general event and thus
remember it differently. On one hand, people who experience the same general
event, such as a war or an earthquake, do not experience the same particular
events that are subsumed under the general one, such as a specific battle or a
specific building collapse. On the other hand, even people who experience the
same event do not necessarily experience and remember it in the same way,
because of the particular evaluative components that shape the way in which
each individual perceives and remembers a specific state of affairs. For exam-
ple, during a particular act of torture, the tortured will certainly not have the
same experience and thus memory of it as the torturer. On the other hand, some
individuals of a collective who actively remember a historical past episode that
continues to shape their identity did not even directly experience the episode in
question. In fact, Assmann (1995) has proposed that the most significant collec-
tive memories that shape the cultural identity of a community go beyond the
individuals who actually experienced the event remembered, and become acces-
sible across the centuries.6 That is why although members of a community may
not exactly remember the same specific event or experience, the collective
memory about the general event that affected the whole community “belongs to
them” (Blustein, 2008, p. 183), in the same way that some significant personal
memories are intrinsically tied to the identity of an individual. Furthermore, as
Blustein (2008) has explained, to reduce the notion of collective memory to
collective beliefs or other forms of discursive production implies forgetting the
variety of other forms of remembering that involve memory activities and
memory places.7
The problematic nature of collective memory and the wide variety of conceptu-
alizations and uses of this notion are manifest and well known. I do not intend
here either to deepen this debate or propose a final solution to this conceptual
problem.8 Starting from three premises—(a) that Michaelian and Sutton’s (2017)
notion of a truly collective memory is quite reductive and so establishes an
essential difference between small-scale group memories and large-scale repre-
sentations of a common and shared past; (b) that collective memory seems to
involve different kind of entities (not only individuals) and practices, and is thus
better conceived as a complex and dynamic process that extends through time;
and (c) that it plays a key role for the internal cohesion and the identity of the
collective such as individual memory does for the individual (I will say more
about collective memory functions in the next section)— here I propose to use
a reformulation of the “epidemiological” approach to collective memory outlined
by Hirst and Manier (2008) as a working definition of “collective memory.” This
approach focuses on how a memory of a shared past spreads across a collective,
as if it were an epidemic disease. I thus conceive collective memory as a set of
complex and dynamic processes of interaction between societal memory prac-
tices, mnemonic technologies, cultural tools, institutions, and individuals,
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through which (not necessarily discursive) representations of a common past
are constructed, reconstructed, performed, and also sometimes deconstructed or
crystalized and transmitted to subsequent generations. These representations of
a common and shared past refer to representations of events that were experi-
enced in some way by the collective or by a significant proportion of its
members, or by the collective’s ancestors or the ancestors of a significant propor-
tion of its members.
It is clear that interaction does not always have to take place among all these
different entities; nor has it to involve a variety of practices. This is typically the
case for small-scale groups, like groups of friends, who remember a significant
event from the past, such as a trip. Whereas the collective memory can be
constructed or reconstructed through the dynamic interaction among friends who
talk together while looking at photographs of the trip, it is unlikely that institu-
tions and more complex societal practices and technologies intervene in this
process. Nonetheless, collective memories of large-scale groups, such as
communities, countries, and regions, in the long run involve all the elements
and entities previously mentioned. These kinds of memories endure longer than
those of the small groups, and usually refer to events that are or could be stud-
ied by historians. I thus reserve the term “historical memory” for these last cases,
which I conceive as a kind of collective memory.
The strong version of epistemic responsibility is certainly adequate for the under-
standing of memories of small-scale groups, because a relationship of care exists
among their members, as is the case in families and group of friends, or because
it exists not necessarily among their members, but towards the preservation and
proper functioning of the group itself, as is the case in groups of business part-
ners or coworkers. Therefore, it is possible to say that small-scale group remem-
berers are responsible for engaging in different kinds of actions in order to
control, monitor, and update their collective memory representations, but are
also responsible for having certain kinds of attitudes, such as being self-critical,
open-minded, and responsive as a group to all members’ perspectives on the
shared past. Many of the significant memories for group identity refer more to
the meaning of an event, to its evaluation, than to its physical properties. That is
why if only one perspective is imposed on the group, the memory is not integral
and thus not really accurate.
Nevertheless, this strong version of epistemic responsibility applied to memory
does not seem adequate for understanding the case of large-scale collectives who
remember a common and shared past. Large-scale collective memories are more
difficult to grasp than small-scale ones. First, large-scale collectives do not have
clear and established limits, so it is not always easy to trace a line between those
who are part of the collective and those who are not. What is more, their
members may change through time: the current members of the collective may
not have directly experienced the remembered event, and all those who experi-
enced it may already be dead. On the other hand, members of the collective
occupy different positions in the social reality at the moment of experiencing
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the event and at the moment of reconstructing it as well. That is why large-scale
human groups are crisscrossed by different relationships that individuals estab-
lish among them, which in some cases can be very lopsided in terms of power.
Because of the complexity and heterogeneity of large-scale collectives, and the
thin or almost nonexistent ties among their members, it is not easy to conceive
that they could have epistemic responsibilities as rememberers in the strong
sense presented above. If relationships among their members are not based on
mutual care or care for the group, there is no reason to be open-minded and
responsive to other perspectives of the past. If nonetheless there is an epistemic
responsibility towards other people when recollecting the shared and common
past, it may be grounded in something other than care. On the other hand, as
rememberers of historical events, we can simply contrast our representations of
the past with material traces and history in order to form accurate representa-
tions. So maybe a basic version of epistemic responsibility applies better to
collective representations of a shared and common past. Nonetheless, given the
particularities of large-scale collectives, the relationship between history as an
academic discipline and memories of historical events is neither simple nor
unidirectional.
In the next section, I develop a characterization of the particularities of histori-
cal memory and exemplify it with concrete historical cases in order to better
understand its nature and conceptualize it; then, in the last section, I develop a
notion of epistemic responsibility applicable to historical memories.
HISTORICAL MEMORY: ITS PARTICULARITIES
The term “historical memory” is used in the literature, but not defined with preci-
sion. In fact, it is sometimes used by members of a collective to express a
demand for justice, and sometimes by the state itself to compensate for past
crimes.9 The association of the notion of historical memory with memory of
distant events from present times is quite common and goes back to Halbwachs
(1950, especially chapter 2), for whom there exists a distinction—and opposi-
tion—between historical memory and collective memory. Nonetheless, this char-
acterization is confused: he even admits that the expression “historical memory”
is inadequate. His main interest is actually to distinguish collective memory from
history. Whereas collective memory is related to the experiences of a group,
history introduces conceptualizations and temporal distinctions that are absent
from collective memory representations. For Halbwachs, as the temporal
distance from the past event increases, the event ceases to be the object of the
collective memory and becomes part of the historical memory (Barash, 2016).
But temporal distance and opposition to history cannot be considered criteria
for defining historical memory, since contemporary history does not deal only
with the distant past (Koselleck, 2002). In fact, history as an academic disci-
pline coexists with representations of significant past events shared by a large-
scale collective.
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I thus propose understanding historical memory as a kind of collective memory
that presents certain characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of collec-
tive memories.
First, the objects of historical memories refer to events of great importance for
social cohesion, because of their traumatic impact for the collective and their
consequences in the present.
Second, as I just mentioned, historical memory involves large-scale collectives;
that is why it is characterized by a marked heterogeneity.
Thirdly, because of this multiplicity and heterogeneity, historical memory is
essentially pierced and permeated by substantial relations of power that estab-
lish unbalanced relationships among the members of the collective.
Fourthly, historical memory accomplishes different functions for the collective
that are not truth oriented, and this makes its relation with truth problematic.
And finally, historical memory maintains a dynamic but complex relationship
with history, which sometimes is harmonious, and at other times is tense and
conflictive.
In the following subsections, I explain each of these characteristics in more
detail.
The objects of historical memory
Historical memory seems to be focused on events that are part of the identity of
a collective because of their traumatic impact and their emotionally charged
nature. Whereas individual personal memories and significant memories of
small-scale collectives can have a negative but also a positive valence (the
memory of the wonderful first year of life on campus can be at the origin of the
cohesion of a group of friends), historical memories are in general traumatic in
nature. Positive past events persist in the present in the form of rituals, anniver-
saries, and festivals, all of which have in general become quite detached from the
past event in question and have acquired a new meaning for the collective: a
gathering moment or a nonworking day (such as it happens in some countries’
commemoration of their independence day). In certain ways, memories of past
positive events have metamorphosed into a sort of collective procedural memory,
a traditional internalized practice that has lost its attachment to its origins and is
not performed for commemorative purposes any more. That is why murders,
disappearances, massacres, deportations, imprisonment in inhumane conditions,
torture, repression, criminal negligence, and the like are commonly the object of
historical memories. This characteristic establishes an important distinction
between the standard or normal type of individual and of small-scale collective
memories and the standard or normal type of historical memory.
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On the other hand, although historical memory interacts with historical knowl-
edge, historical memories are not similar to the historical knowledge that a
collective may have, such as “The Argentinian caudillo Facundo Quiroga was
murdered in Barranca Yaco.” This difference, besides the fact that historical
memories are not reducible to simple beliefs but include memory activities and
memory places, is similar to the difference, introduced in the literature on indi-
vidual memory, between episodic and semantic memories (Tulving, 1972).
Whereas the objects of historical memories are events experienced by the collec-
tive or by a significant proportion of its members, or by the collective’s ances-
tors or by the ancestors of a significant proportion of its members, historical
knowledge refers to historical facts, endorsed by academic history, that through
education have also become part of the collective background knowledge.10 As
in the case of the individual memory, the difference is useful but not always
neat, because of the complex interactions that exist between the two types of
memories. In any case, I will come back to this topic in the section about history
and historical memory.
Finally, historical memories refer to traumatic events that still have negative
consequences in the present for the collective or for a part of it, even if the causal
connection is extended through centuries, as it happens with colonization for
the First Peoples. In some cases, the consequences of the event have already
disappeared and material and symbolic reparations have been granted, but the
event is still remembered because it represents or symbolizes similar injustices
to present or more recent ones.
Heterogeneity of memories of large-scale collectives
As a result of the conjunction of these characteristics—large-scale collectives
who remember an emotionally charged event from their past that still has a nega-
tive impact in the present—historical memory is much more heterogeneous and
complex than other forms of collective memory. The use of the singular term
should not hide the fact that it is a complex and often conflictual social construc-
tion, whose tensions are not always solved and may resurface under certain
circumstances. That is why in many cases it seems more appropriate to talk about
historical memories in the plural. Disputes between different historical memory
constructions of the same event are quite common. These disputes can some-
times even present the characteristics of a war, whose trophy is the epithet “the
true representation of the past.” This is the case for the memory of the Civitella
Val di Chiana Massacre in 1944 in Italy, when Nazi soldiers murdered 115 men
as retaliation for a partisan attack. While the victims’ relatives remember them
as martyrs of a violence that they did not cause and make the partisans respon-
sible for the massacre, the partisans vindicate the attack as a heroic act (Portelli,
2013).
In some other cases, a specific historical memory is established as if it were the
only one available, by silencing other possible collective representations of the
past and fixing a unique meaning to the event remembered. This is what some-
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times happens with the “official” memory: the memory held by the state—which
is also a form of historical memory and uses the school apparatus as powerful
instrument of transmission—might also conflict with more local memories held
by different members of the community. For example, the armed struggle to
establish the Argentinean national state by advancing on territories first inhab-
ited by Indigenous peoples was named “Conquest of the Desert” in classical
historiography and school manuals. Through formal education, this notion
became a popular term used by Argentinians to refer to that period of time.
However, the descendants of those first inhabitants have questioned the idea of
a “desert,” because it makes reference to an empty space when in fact that terri-
tory was inhabited by multiple tribes. Nowadays, the notion of a genocide of
the Indigenous populations has come to the fore (Delrio et al., 2010).
It is common that those who occupy subaltern positions in the social reality, and
are thus in a poor position to directly influence the socially accepted memory of
a shared past, build a collective memory that strengthens their own identity
against the hegemonic or official one (Castells, 2009). But other collectives that
are not necessarily in subaltern positions also privilege the social cohesion gener-
ated by the historical memory and avoid in this way facing the challenges that
may arise when confronted with its factual corroboration. An interesting exam-
ple to illustrate this point is the case of the common “error” in the historical
memory of the Fosse Ardeatine Massacre that was carried out in Rome in 1944,
when German soldiers killed 335 people in retaliation for a partisan attack. While
the German reaction was immediate, all survivors stated that several days, even
months, passed between one event and another (Portelli, 2002). Portelli consid-
ers these massive fallacious memories to be unintentional, the result of the
collective meaning that survivors gave to what happened: that the partisans could
have avoided retaliation if they had surrendered.
The large-scale nature that characterizes historical memory diversifies in huge
proportions not only the experiences that the members of the collective have of
the same historical event, but also the events experienced. The degree of involve-
ment during the event can be also extremely broad and includes simple witnesses
who passively suffered as a consequence of a past event, among a wide variety
of intermediate situations (LaCapra, 2016). For example, an economic crisis that
causes the ruin of a family will be experienced differently by the family nucleus
in comparison with the group of distant relatives. The massive difference in the
degree of involvement is also present during the construction and persistence of
a historical memory, which are not automatic processes but depend on the effec-
tive articulation of several factors, such as particular actors, symbolic and mate-
rial resources, and practices. A particular historical memory is usually nurtured
and maintained by those members of the collective who occupy prominent posi-
tions in the community, such as the governing body. But its persistence also
requires the participation of other actors who actively support and promote it
over time from their own specific social spheres of influence (economic, polit-
ical, or cultural spheres). These actors refer to what Jelín (2002) has called
“memory entrepreneurs,” such as the famous Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi
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(Levi, 1995). At the other extreme of the spectrum of involvement and compro-
mise, there are members of the collective who are less committed or who are
even completely passive. Once a collective representation of the shared past
becomes more or less stable during a certain amount of time, it is usually struc-
tured in highly ritualized forms such as ceremonies, institutions, and social prac-
tices. These rituals fix the meaning of the remembered event and, at the same
time, free individuals to autonomously consent to the truthfulness of the histor-
ical memory. That is why some members of the collective limit themselves to
tacitly accepting these different collective rituals without either being part of its
design or worrying about its transmission or possible expansion. Finally, histor-
ical memories usually transcend the limits imposed by the life of their original
bearers. Therefore, the collective who remembers an important episode of its
common past can include new generations who have only indirect knowledge
about the event because they have not directly experienced it.
Relations of power
Relations of power are at the centre of historical memories, and this establishes
an important difference with individual memory and other kinds of small-scale
collectives. Individuals sometimes struggle with themselves, their self-image,
their desires, or their beliefs at the time of reconstructing personal past experi-
ences. But cases of self-deception, where the individual seems to be split into one
self who persuades other self of some biased interpretation of the personal past,
are not really analogous to the relations of power that are intrinsic to the nature
of historical memory.11
Power refers to the ability of a social agent to influence through his or her actions
a particular state of affairs, which can also include the actions of others. This
capacity is directly related to the positions that those agents occupy in a partic-
ular social context. That is why, in general, power establishes asymmetric rela-
tions between different actors, depending on the degree of influence that each
one can exercise (Giddens, 1984). Concerning historical memory, we can distin-
guish different kinds of power relations that permeate it. First, relations of power
are present at the moments of construction and consolidation of a specific histor-
ical memory. Because, in general, events experienced and experiences are thor-
oughly different within a large-scale collective, it is expected then that tensions
and conflict among the members of the collective will be common during the
negotiations over the meaning of that past event, and that the outcome of the
negotiations will depend on relations of power. Second, relations of power are
also present in the disputes over the “right” interpretation of the shared past.
This happens when there are different collectives (including the state) that have
divergent visions about what happened. Moreover, relations of power exist when
dissident voices are silenced immediately after the event through a sort of ad
hominem fallacy whereby the credibility and the identity of their bearers are
implicitly or explicitly cast into doubt or harmed. These power relations are also
present when dissident voices cannot even be raised due to hermeneutical
marginalization—that is, when members of a collective lack interpretative and
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conceptual resources to understand their own experience (Fricker, 2006). These
last two cases (and specially the last one) are in general grounded in socioeco-
nomic conditions of inequality between those who are marginalized—and who
cannot even construct their own historical memory—and those who establish
the meaning of the historical past.
In conclusion, whereas other forms of collective memories, such as family
memories, may sometimes be shaped by unequal power relations, the case of
historical memories is quite different: these are essentially pierced and perme-
ated by different kinds of relations of power due mainly to their essential hetero-
geneity.
Functions of historical memory
All the previous sections lead to the conclusion that historical memory is more
oriented toward internal cohesion and the purposes of identity than toward a
faithful reconstruction of a shared past. As Wertsch (2009) has written, “this is
not to say that accuracy is not important or is not assumed by those doing the
remembering, but it does mean that accuracy is of secondary importance and
may be sacrificed to the extent required to serve other functions” (p. 123). In
this sense historical memory is similar to individual forms of memory of
personal experiences. Whereas the variety of functions of autobiographical
memories are the object of recent discussion, most cognitive psychologists argue
that the aim of memory is not to give access to past experiences, since the fact
of giving access to past experiences is only a capability but not a function of
memory (Klein et al., 2009). Autobiographical memory allows individuals to
plan present and future behaviour and thought (directive function), to preserve
and promote continuity and development of the self (self function), and to main-
tain and nurture social bonds (social function) (Bluck et al., 2005). In the same
vein, historical memory also presents the following functions:
(a) A directive function. A community can use its past to plan actions and proj-
ect itself into the future, and to draw lessons from the past and avoid repeating
past mistakes (Todorov, 2001). Authors such as Szpunar and Szpunar (2016)
have even stated that the collective projection into the future (or “collective
future thought,” in their terms) is in fact the “driving force” that guides the recon-
struction of collective memories.
(b) An identity function. Historical memory shapes and sustains the commu-
nity’s identity and its internal cohesion through time, so that the community can
become aware of its unity and peculiarity (Assmann, 1995).
(c) A social function. Historical memory can help to strengthen the emotional
bonding among the members of a community, and also to help them cope and
heal from past traumas.
These functions are neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and probably differ across
cultures and according to specific features of the historical time (Wang, 2008).
In any case, they give us an idea of the way in which memory functions, in both
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individual and collective cases, and they distance memory itself from the pursuit
of truth. As Blustein has stated, historical memory “is caught in a kind of tug of
war between history and myth” (2008, p. 200):12 on one hand, as a representa-
tion of the past, it aims to be accurate, but, on the other hand, it accomplishes
other important functions for the community that are truth independent. This
bipolarity that characterizes historical memory is responsible for the tensions
that it maintains with history.
The relationship between historical memory and history
Historical memory maintains a dynamic and complex relationship with history
(understood as an academic discipline). And in this it differs from individual
memories and other forms of collective memories, such as family memories.
Although some historians are currently concerned about the way in which fami-
lies remember (Green and Luscombe, 2019), their interest is focused on memo-
ries’ structure, mechanisms, and interactions with other institutions and not on
their content per se. On the other hand, history not only researches historical
memory as a particular form of shared social representation, but also uses histor-
ical memory as a source for understanding the historical event in question. This
happens because history and historical memory are both directed towards the
same object: a particular historical event that is studied by history and remem-
bered by a collective.
Because of this common object, interaction between history and historical
memory is inevitable. Historical memory can be complemented and reinforced
by history, or it can be in tension with it. In some cases, historical research can
be formally convened to prove the truth of a particular historical memory. In
response to social demands or legal requirements, historians act as experts to
determine whether historical memories comply with their claims of accuracy or
not (Rousso 2008). For example, a team not of historians but of anthropologists
recently started excavations in some mass graves in the Argentinian Chaco in
order to provide legal evidence for the Napalpí Massacre of the Qom people that
occurred in 1924. This massacre, longtime denied and then forgotten, has
survived until today only through the testimony of the elderly (who have since
died, except for one woman, Rosa Grillo), so the result of scientific research is
of the utmost importance for the legal case that is in process and which may lead
to a truth trial (Sinay, 2019).13 In other cases, historical research itself can detect
fallacious elements in historical memories. When this happens, the collective
may react in unfriendly ways to the “intrusion” made by history that puts into
question and even cracks a particular formation of historical memory. This is
what happened in the case of the destruction of the Jewish community in
Jedwabne, Poland, in 1941. The Polish inhabitants thought that the Nazi had
carried out the massacre by setting fire to a barn with 1 600 Jewish people inside.
But the truth was that the Polish inhabitants themselves had been responsible
for the mass murder. Nonetheless, the version given by the Polish inhabitants
was consolidated as the predominant historical memory, probably because it
helped to strengthen a certain social identity: that the Polish were simply victims
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of the foreign occupation and never active participants in the persecution of
Jewish people. The true story did not become nationally known until 2000, with
the publication of the book Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Commu-
nity in Jedwabne (Gross, 2001: the Polish version was published one year
before). This book sparked a controversy in Poland: many Polish people doubted
the credibility of Gross’s account, and this provoked an intensive two-year public
and academic debate and even an official investigation by the Institute of
National Remembrance (Wolentarska-Ochman, 2006).
Because historical memory is halfway between myth and history, “[historical]
memory does not entirely retreat from history, and therefore [historical] memory
becomes vulnerable to correction by history” (Blustein, 2008, p. 178). Blustein’s
argument could be formalized as follows: because historical memory, as any
other kind of memory, has truth as one if its values, and because truth is the
regulative ideal of history,14 as it is of science, historical memory is answerable
to the outcomes of historical research. Therefore, although historical memory
may in some cases resist historical evidence, history provides a sort of “empir-
ical base” to which collective representations of a shared and common past can
be contrasted so that they will eventually be corrected. This nevertheless does not
mean that historical memory can be reduced to the sum of beliefs about the
shared past, as I already explained. Whereas history belongs to the discursive
domain, historical memory includes memory activities and memory places. The
contrast with history thus is not as straightforward as the contrast with empiri-
cal evidence is for an individual who has formed a false memory. It certainly
takes more time and may involve practices and activities that go beyond the
discursive domain, such as public manifestations.
EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY APPLIED TO HISTORICAL MEMORY
The previous section discloses the main characteristics of historical memory that
are significant for understanding what it could mean to be an epistemically
responsible collective that remembers its historical past.
Unlike individual memories and other kinds of collective memories, relations of
power, which are the product of the heterogeneity that characterizes historical
memory, are intrinsic to their constitution, configuration, and maintenance, so it
is expected that they are much more prone to distortion and falsity. These rela-
tions of power, together with the different truth-independent functions that
historical memories accomplishes, are likely to doubly distance historical
memory from the pursuit of truth.
What is more, false, distorted, or partial historical memories seem to be much
more harmful than individual or small-scale collective memories. When a subject
produces false memories, either because his or her memory is adaptive relative
to a specific function or because he or she simply failed to be an epistemically
vigilant agent, the negative consequences of these distortions or delusions seem
to be minimal. If the memory is false but adaptive, the positive outcomes can
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compensate for the negative ones. This happens, for example, when one remem-
bers a positively biased memory of one’s past self: this memory can directly
benefit one’s current self-image and influence future behaviours and motiva-
tions for the better (Howe, 2011). On the other hand, if the memory is false and
has no adaptive value, it can certainly present some disadvantages for the
rememberer, especially if he or she acts guided by it. It is true that a false
memory that is adaptive for the individual can also negatively impact on the
rememberer’s thick relationships. From the fact that some false memories with
adaptive value for the rememberer can present negative consequences for the
people close to him or her, we can infer the importance of remembering the
event with integrity by taking the perspectives of those to whom we owe care
into consideration. Nonetheless, false individual and small-scale group memo-
ries do not in general have negative consequences for people beyond the remem-
berer and the exclusive circle of individuals with whom he or she maintains
thick relationships.
This presents a significant difference from historical memory. Whereas distorted
and biased historical memories may not have any negative consequence for me
or my family, they can present negative outcomes for people who are not
members of the collective or who are at its margins, but whose perspective of the
past event is generally excluded from the dominant and sometimes false repre-
sentation of the past. A distorted historical memory can fulfil a specific func-
tion, such as national cohesion, but this fulfilment cannot compensate for the
damage done to those who are excluded. This would be the case for the construc-
tion of the fallacious historical memory (very widespread until recently) that
characterizes the arrival and domination of white settlers in the American conti-
nent as a civilizing process. Together with their symbolic exclusion and the
impossibility of ending the grief over the death of their ancestors, this memory
that conceals the great massacres that were perpetrated in the name of the
supposed civilization denies the survivors of the First Peoples their possibility
of participating in the life of the contemporary community. In doing so, it causes
and reinforces their economic marginalization. As the case of the Indigenous
peoples of Latin America shows, the conditions of their current poverty can be
seen as a consequence of the discrimination and persecution that began in the
past (World Bank, 2015). Because there is always some group who suffers from
a collective distortion of the past (even when they cannot find a way to express
their suffering), false historical memories seem to be much more noxious than
false individual memories.
Consequently, historical memories are those memories that require the greatest
vigilance due to their strong tendency toward falsity and distortion, and to the
meaningful ways in which falsity and distortion negatively affect other people.
It remains to be seen what kind of mechanisms collectives have at their disposal
in order to be epistemically vigilant and responsible rememberers of their shared
history, and what may push collectives to adopt this vigilant stance.
The first possible mechanism that comes to mind is metacognition. Do collec-
tives have an ability to monitor their own memories, as individuals do? Accord-
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ing to Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian (2020), large-scale groups do not have
metacognitive capacities, because any change can be explained by appealing to
decision-making processes of their members. Their reasoning is nonetheless
based in a more general argument that denies that collectives are capable of
remembering because neither they display mental states nor their members prop-
erly interact with each other during encoding and retrieval. However, I have
conceived historical memory not as a mental phenomenon, but as complex and
dynamic processes of interaction among elements of different nature (individu-
als, practices, institutions, material things, etc.) that take place through time.
Although their argument thus does not directly concern the conception of histor-
ical memory that is at stake here, it is true that metacognition is a mental
phenomenon that loses its essence if it is applied to historical memory. Collec-
tives can perform different kinds of actions and practices to monitor the truth-
fulness of their memories, but it would be misleading to state that these actions
and practices are automatic or well-defined mechanisms that develop quite spon-
taneously in a collective, as it happens for individual rememberers.
The strong tendency of historical memories toward falsity and distortion is not
counterbalanced by strong mechanisms of control and monitoring, but quite the
contrary: these are in fact inexistent. Whereas individual memory, thanks to
metacognitive mechanisms, is quite reliable at least in what concerns its factual
content, historical memory is not reliable. Collectives are not naturally prone to
developing a basic epistemically vigilant attitude directed toward their memo-
ries, as individuals are. Therefore, actions and practices of control and monitor-
ing can be the outcome of a collective effort exclusively, “of a willingness to
explore these matters, to air the past and to pursue the evidence wherever it may
lead, and to hear the testimony of those who feel they have been wronged” (Blus-
tein, 2008, p. 141). In this collective and purposeful effort, there are two actions
and practices that are essential to controlling and monitoring the accuracy of
existent historical memories and avoiding the collective amnesia of some signif-
icant historical events. First, the outcomes of historical research and other histor-
ical resources such as archives and documents (which nowadays are more
accessible to the general public through the internet) are a key source for accu-
rately informing public debate and public discourse. Although collective
memory cannot be replaced by history because of the other vital functions that
it accomplishes (Blustein, 2008), it can become, through its interaction with
history, closer to a historical understanding of the shared and common past.
The contributions of history are certainly essential, but they do not account for
all the forms that a collective effort toward controlling and monitoring histori-
cal memories can take. Among the most important ones figures the willingness
“to hear the testimony of those who feel they have been wronged.” This is partic-
ularly important when historical research on the event has not yet started or is
still underway, so those testimonies have not been incorporated into a historical
narrative and may have been only sporadically heard by some members of the
collective. One example of this case is the testimonies of the Grandmothers of
the Plaza de Mayo, an organization formed in Argentina during the last dicta-
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torship (1976–1983) by grandmothers whose aim was to look for their grand-
children stolen during repression or born in prison. Their voices were ignored by
many local and international institutions that they contacted to get humanitarian
aid, until the newspaper the Buenos Aires Herald published a letter written by
them that announced that children were stolen and people had been “disap-
peared.” This act of giving discursive space to marginal voices contributed to
disseminating a fact that until then was at most believed or suspected only by
some people (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2007). So, in certain way, it acted as
a sort of vaccine against an eventual collective amnesia.15 On the other hand,
the Plaza de Mayo example is also useful for showing how collectives purpose-
fully engage in actions and practices of control and monitoring: through the divi-
sion of labour (Margalit, 2002). This means that members engage in different
actions and practices to different degrees of involvement in order to make the
collective into a vigilant epistemic agent. For example, whereas some of them,
minimally involved, may assure the transmission of information, others, more
engaged, may volunteer for organizations that do memorial work or advocate for
the establishment of truth commissions (Blustein, 2008, p. 215). Collective
measures can also be taken by institutional agents, as happens with the imple-
mentation of educational practices that train new generations in respect, soli-
darity and recognition of differences, and which instill a real collective concern
about past injustices and past episodes of violence and immorality.
The perspective of those who were offended and injured in the past and who
were (or still are) in an unequal relation of power with respect to the collective
or some of its members is also essential for correcting biased historical memo-
ries for the sake of their integrity. For example, historical memories of many
nations refer to a heroic past that often hides violent or even aberrant acts. The
celebrations of October 12 as the anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s arrival
in the Americas in 1492 masks the atrocities committed by Columbus and other
Europeans against the Indigenous populations. An integral reconstruction of
those outrageous events cannot be omitted from an epistemically responsible
historical memory. Partial historical memories present only one side of what
happened, but do not fully account for the past event; although they may not
necessarily be distorted, they are fragmentary and incomplete, thus not truly
accurate.
But even when those testimonies are already part of an integral collective repre-
sentation of the past event—as it happens nowadays with the abduction and ille-
gal adoption of children during the last Argentine dictatorship—in many
circumstances these voices still need to be heard to allow the present collective
to better grasp the evaluative aspects of the past and the particular significant
ways in which that past had a direct impact on people’s life. Beyond the
academic interest that these testimonies can have for historical science, the open-
ness to other voices and experiences, especially those of minorities and margin-
alized members of the collective who were (or still are) in a disadvantageous
position, demands epistemic and moral virtues of the collective that are absent
from the basic version of epistemic vigilance described above. The basic version
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is focused only on the need to control and monitor actions, but ignores and
considers irrelevant the attitudes that rememberers must present to adequately
orient and shape those actions. The strong version incorporates the need for these
virtuous attitudes, so it seems more adequate for understanding the epistemic
responsibility of collective rememberers. Nonetheless, it is not clear in what
principle or value it may be grounded, given that the idea of relationships of
mutual care among the members of large-scale collectives seems suspicious.
The consideration for the pragmatic consequences of misremembering or forget-
ting is a preliminary intuitive answer and is frequently endorsed in the litera-
ture, which presents epistemic responsibility regarding memory as part of a
general framework of taking responsibility for past injustices. According to the
consequentialist approach, the collective vigilant stance is desirable because of
the state of affairs it brings about: it is necessary to compensate and repair past
injustices and also to prevent similar events in the future. This last characteris-
tic, for example, is the one that Todorov (2001) attributes to “exemplar memo-
ries,” which are defined as those that actively intervene in the present with the
aim of avoiding repetition in the future. But these pragmatic benefits are not at
all guaranteed by a collective vigilant stance: the construction of accurate histor-
ical memories does not necessarily bring about reparative actions, and may even
be useless for avoiding repetition in the future. What is more, as Blustein (2015)
explains, these pragmatic benefits assume that accurate and integral memories
present only “auxiliary obligations” (p. 77) and are thus not really valuable per
se. This implies that testimonies and different perspectives on the past remem-
bered have no real value beyond their eventual contribution to reparative justice
and future prevention.
Although the collective belief in the practical advantages of accurate historical
memories may be a motive that leads certain members of the collective or certain
collectives to acquire a vigilant stance towards the common and shared past, it
is worth it to explore whether there are other ways of justifying collective epis-
temic vigilance in nonconsequentialist terms. Blustein (2015), for example, has
proposed different nonconsequentialist approaches and highlighted the impor-
tance of drawing on insights of various theoretical sources in order to avoid an
oversimplified analysis of the phenomenon. But his analysis is focused on the
moral obligation of remembrance and not on the notion of epistemic vigilance
that is at stake here, so it simply does not translate into this case.16 Margalit’s
(2002) distinction between an ethics and a morality of memory (which is also
reworked by Blustein, 2008) may be more useful for thinking about the justifi-
cation of collective epistemic vigilance applied to historical memories. Accord-
ing to Margalit (2002), an ethics of memory is related to care and thick
relationships and partiality, and a morality of memory is based on the concepts
of right and wrong and impersonal duty. The duty of truthfulness may explain
and justify collective epistemic vigilance towards historical memory. Because its
high degree of heterogeneity, its diverse functions, and its configuration of power
relations that doubles the distance between historical memory and the pursuit of
truth, the collective vigilant stance can be conceived as a duty valuable per se.
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Nonetheless, it is very plausible that real collectives that state being concerned
by the duty of truthfulness are in fact partially concerned by the beneficial conse-
quences that accurate representations of the past bring for the collective.
On the other hand, the idea that collective epistemic vigilance applied to histor-
ical memory can be grounded on care does not seem in principle to be very plau-
sible, and has been one of the reasons invoked above to explore what sort of
epistemic responsibility could be appropriate in the case of historical memories.
Margalit is of the opinion that “humanity is not a community of memory” (2002,
p. 9) because it is almost impossible to generate and sustain caring relationships
among its members. He is probably right regarding the collective that refers to
the whole humanity, but there are other forms of care that could be integrated
into this picture in order to avoid the denial of all concern and compassion for
understanding the reasons and justifications that may lead large-scale collec-
tives to be vigilant epistemic rememberers. A large-scale collective can care
about the collective itself, about its preservation or change, and about the appro-
priate collective recognition of all of its members’ understandings of their past
(Blustein, 2008), in ways similar (but not identical) to the way in which groups
of business partners or coworkers care. This general care for the community
does not need to presuppose the existence of relationships of care among the
community’s members. On the other hand, relationships of “extended” care can
be forged among their members without that implying the existence of thick
relationships among them. The Chinese philosopher Mengzi thought that the
care we have for our intimate circle can be extended to others with whom we
have no direct contact when we come to see their similarity to those close to us
(Schwitzgebel, 2019). Therefore, members of the collective can extend care to
other people with whom they only have thin relationships because they under-
stand the similarities that exist between those who are dear to them and those
who are not. Although it may be improper to consider large-scale collective
rememberers to be communities of memory based on care (as many small-scale
collective rememberers can be considered), it is possible to believe that the
collective vigilant stance applied to historical memory is not totally grounded on
its pragmatic benefits, because it can also be partially founded in a feeling of care
(care for the community or extension of care).
CONCLUSION
This analysis has shown that despite the different characteristics that individual
and historical memories present,17 the vigilant stance that makes individuals and
collectives responsible epistemic rememberers is based on similar grounds: prag-
matic considerations about the negative consequences of misremembering or
forgetting and a feeling of care. Although the proportions and interplay between
these elements may differ (care may be predominant in individual and small-
scale collective memories), as well as the specific actions and practices of control
and monitoring, the general principles that govern the epistemic responsibility
of all these different cases of representations about significant past experiences
may partially justify the use of the same epithet—“memory”—to refer to these
different representations (a use that is sometimes questioned in the literature).
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In conclusion, the strong version of epistemic responsibility delineated above
seems to be adequate for conceptualizing the collective epistemic responsibility
that applies to historical memories. Collective rememberers are not only respon-
sible for engaging in different kinds of actions and practices (such as the contrast
with history) in order to control and monitor their memory representations and
avoid collective amnesia, but are also responsible for developing certain kinds
of virtuous attitudes such as being responsive to dissident voices that emerge
outside or on the margins of the collective, or even allowing their emergence. It
is this openness and responsiveness that allows a collective to avoid self-decep-
tion and to be self-critical. Epistemic vigilance applied to historical memory,
just as to individual memories, partially depends on the development of collec-
tive virtue.
Certainly, large-scale collectives may sometimes fail to be epistemically respon-
sible rememberers, such as individual and small-scale groups also fail to be.
Nonetheless, the notion under scrutiny accomplishes its task, because it intends
not only to describe the phenomenon but also to be used as a regulatory ideal.
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NOTES
1 For example, it does not seem necessary to engage in monitoring and control processes if I
do not remember now—while at work—the exact time next Tuesday when I agreed to meet
my friend. But it is necessary to do so if I am not sure to remember the exact time on the day
of the meeting, because the meeting itself is at risk. If in this last scenario I do not look at the
texts I exchanged with my friend or call her directly to check the time, I will probably miss
the meeting and be blamed by my friend (and even blame myself) for not having engaged in
any kind of action to monitor my dubious memory.
2 It is true nonetheless that epistemic vigilance with respect to memory may vary depending
on individuals and contextual factors such as their culture.
3 Because epistemic responsibility differs from moral responsibility as concerns memory, it is
in principle conceivable—at least from a theoretical point of view—to be an epistemically
responsible rememberer without being at the same time a morally responsible rememberer.
Even if such a case is very unlikely, we can certainly imagine a very rational and Kantian
human being who is obsessed with truth and thus extremely concerned about getting a
complete picture of what happened in the past. That is why he or she decides to take into
account the perspective of another person; so this truth-obsessed individual is not really
moved by the care that he or she should provide to this other person. In fact, he or she cares
neither about considering the other person’s perspective nor about this other person; he or she
cares only about accuracy.
4 Although Ricœur explicitly highlights the limitations of this perspective (2006, p. 124–132),
he also analyzes some aspects of collective memory according to categories generally attrib-
uted to individual memory, such as psychoanalytic categories (see Lythgoe, 2007). That is
why he could be considered as an advocate of the individualist conception of memory. I
recognize nonetheless that this idea may be controversial for some Ricœur scholars.
5 This position is explicitly denied by Michaelian and Sutton (2017): “whereas analyses of
collective belief focus on cases in which a group can be said to believe a single, determinate
proposition, it is, in many cases of collective memory, implausible to ascribe a single, deter-
minate memory to the group” (p. 147). But on the other hand, the authors also state that “in
such cases of interactive encoding/interactive retrieval, there is interaction among group
members at both encoding and retrieval; individuals learn and recall together. Such cases
correspond to the sorts of ongoing transactive memory systems—stable groups character-
ized by a division of cognitive labor, with group members responsible for remembering differ-
ent aspects of events and playing different roles during encoding and retrieval … Of the four
forms of collective memory distinguished here, interactive/interactive cases—which we will
refer to as cases of strongly shared memory—may have the best chance of representing a
truly collective phenomenon, in the sense that we may legitimately treat the group itself as
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the remembering subject” (p. 143). This strong notion of collective memory based on the
existence of a group-level rememberer can certainly lead one to conclude that the collective
memory is single and determinate without however considering that each member of the
group has exactly the same memory representation. Although this conclusion certainly contra-
dicts the authors’ previous statement, it also follows from the ideas expressed in the last
quotation.
6 Assmann recovers Halbwachs’s (1950) conceptual distinction between collective memory
and historical memory (see some paragraphs below in the main text), but he redefines it. He
uses the terms “communicative memory” and “cultural memory” instead, and considers them
both to be cases of collective memory but to belong to different kinds. For him, collective
memory is a broader concept that includes these two different modalities.
7 The notion of “memory activities” has been taken from Sue Campbell, and “memory places”
from Pierre Nora (Blustein, 2008, p. 185).
8 I clearly do not deal with the problem of the nature of the collective who remembers.
9 The case of Spain is a good example of both meanings. The “Association for the Recovery
of Historical Memory” aims to identify the bodies found in the mass graves used to bury
people who died due to violence during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Francoist
regime (Asociación para la recuperación de la memoria histórica, 2015). In addition, in 2007
the Spanish government sanctioned the “Ley de la Memoria Histórica” (Historical Memory
Law), which aims to recognize the rights of those who were victims of repression and acts
of violence during that period (Ley 57/2007).
10 An interesting question to explore that parallels the understanding of historical and collec-
tive memories is whether there can be a sort of collective historical knowledge or whether
historical knowledge can be possessed only by individuals of the collective.
11 And this is probably one important reason that makes the use a single model of analysis to
understand individual and collective memory consolidation processes impossible, as Anas-
tasio et al. (2012) envisage.
12 Blustein (2008) uses the term “collective memory” in his book. Nonetheless, it broadly corre-
sponds to the conceptualization I have made here of the notion of historical memory.
13 “These “truth trials” (juicios por la verdad), as they became known, were an innovation in
Argentine justice, and possibly in the rest of the Americas. They were unlike ordinary crim-
inal trials in that judicial action was expressly limited to investigation and documentation,
without there being a possibility either of prosecution or punishment. They were based on the
right (both of the relatives and of society as a whole) to know the truth, and the right of the
relatives to bury and mourn their dead (derecho a duelo) (Brett, 2001).
14 Although narrativists like Hayden White have stated that history cannot be objective or truly
scientific, I prefer not to enter into this debate and suppose, as Blustein does, that history
belongs to the scientific realm and has truth as its regulative ideal, and that this means that
“accuracy in what is said about the past is the primary criterion for assessing the quality of
historical research and the achievements of historical inquiry” (2008, p. 178).
15 For the ways in which environmental and social scaffolds can enhance collective amnesia,
see Tanesini (2018).
16 According to Blustein (2015), an act of remembrance can be considered (a) virtuous when it
embodies and flows from some virtue or combination of virtues (virtue ethics); (b) morally
obligatory because of the reparative justice it embodies in officially sanctioned practices of
commemoration, recognition, and symbolic reparation (deontology); (c) appropriate if it
conforms to the adequate expression toward what happened in the past, such as collective
shame (expressivism).
17 The specific characteristics of small-scale collective memories have been sporadically
mentioned, but have not been an object of analysis in this work. Nonetheless, as I briefly
explained, they show more similarities to significant individual memories than to historical
ones.
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